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NON-INFERENTIALISM ABOUT JUSTIFICATION – THE
CASE OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENTS
BY FABIAN DORSCH
In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judge-
mental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non-inferentially.
The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements
by reference to lower-level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that
non-inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic
interest in artworks and other objects is limited to only some of their lower-level features that rea-
lise their higher-level aesthetic qualities. Although my concern with the view that aesthetic judge-
ments are subject to non-inferential justification is very general, my discussion is primarily
structured around Sibley’s well-developed and influential version of this view.
INTRODUCTION
Aesthetic judgements – that is, judgements about the aesthetic qualities of
objects, such as their gracefulness, balance, garishness or harmony – are
characterised by two important features.
First, they are, on the conscious level, often motivated in an immediate man-
ner, that is, formed in some way other than by rationally responding to
the consideration of reasons for or against forming them. We need not
engage in a conscious inference or another form of reasoning or delibera-
tion in order to recognise that, say, a painting is gaudy, a set of pieces of
furniture unified, or a line in a poem elegant.
Secondly, we have an intelligible and reasonable practice of backing up
our aesthetic judgements when they are challenged. More precisely, we
may support our judgements by pointing to certain lower-level properties
that realise the aesthetic qualities concerned. Indeed, when someone casts
some doubt on our aesthetic opinions, we are normally expected to be
able to defend them by referring to some of their relevant underlying
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features. Accordingly, if someone questions whether the painting is gaudy,
we draw his attention to the colour scheme of the work; if he disagrees
with us about the unity of the furniture, we point out to him its relative
proportionality and similarity in design; and if he rejects our statement
about the elegance of the poem, we ask him to listen (really or imagina-
tively) to its recital and notice its sound qualities. As a matter of fact, if
we fail to satisfy this demand of backing up our aesthetic judgements,
their standing – and possibly also our status as a critic in aesthetic matters
– is likely to suffer.
Now, there is a certain tension between these two aspects of aesthetic
judgements, which becomes apparent once we consider their relation to
justification. If we take aesthetic judgements to be justified inferentially, we
owe an explanation of how our actual recognition of aesthetic qualities
can none the less be motivationally immediate on the personal level. This
may require the (controversial) postulation of respective processes of habit-
uation or internalisation, or of some sub-personal or implicit form of
reasoning.
But if, on the other hand, we assume that our justification is non-inferen-
tial, the availability of, and need for, additional support in the shape of
the reference to relevant lower-level features becomes problematic. When
we judge something to be red on the basis of visual perception, it is usu-
ally unreasonable to demand from us to back up our judgement by point-
ing to the responsible lower-level features of the object, such as its surface
reflectances. In fact, we may have no reason for our colour judgements
other than the fact that the object concerned perceptually strikes us as
having a certain colour (and perhaps also the fact that nothing is unusual
or wrong with our mind and our environment during our experience of
the object). By contrast, it is appropriate to ask us to support our aesthetic
judgements by reference to some of their lower-level realisators.
In this essay, I aim to explore and question the prospects of the non-
inferential strategy which, following the tradition of Hume and Kant,
seems to be still the predominant position in contemporary aesthetics.1
This approach has no difficulty in capturing the immediate motivation of
our ascriptions of higher-order properties: we simply form our judgements
1 See, e.g., K. Walton, ‘Categories of Art’, The Philosophical Review, 79 (1970), pp. 334–67;
J. McDowell, ‘Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World’, in E. Schaper
(ed.), Pleasure, Preference and Value (Cambridge UP, 1983), pp. 1–16; M. Budd, ‘Aesthetic Judg-
ements, Aesthetic Principles and Aesthetic Properties’, European Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1999),
pp. 295–311; E. Zemach, ‘What is an Aesthetic Property?’, in E. Brady and J. Levinson
(eds.), Aesthetic Concepts: Essays after Sibley (Oxford UP, 2001), pp. 47–60; or E. Schellekens,
‘Towards a Reasonable Objectivism for Aesthetic Judgements’, The British Journal of Aesthet-
ics, 46 (2006), pp. 163–77.
NON-INFERENTIALISM ABOUT JUSTIFICATION 661
© 2013 The Author The Philosophical Quarterly © 2013 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
in a non-inferential way. But, as I aim to highlight, it cannot accommo-
date our practice of pointing to lower-level features in support of our
opinions. Its best strategy seems to be to interpret this support in non-evi-
dential terms. However, important aspects of this practice – notably the
limits of our aesthetic curiosity – resist this interpretation. My contention
is therefore that the second noted aspect of our recognition of higher-level
features – that it may be backed up by picking out suitable lower-level
properties – cannot be properly explained if our justification in such mat-
ters is understood as being non-inferential in nature. Whether, and how,
immediate motivation can be squared with inferential justification is
another issue, and to be addressed elsewhere.
One of the most sophisticated and influential defenders of non-inferen-
tialism with respect to the epistemology of aesthetic qualities has been
Frank Sibley.2 Because of this, and because of the comprehensiveness and
detailedness of his defense which exhausts the main options available to a
proponent of non-inferential justification, I let my discussion be largely
guided by his writings. But my concern is with the prospects of non-infer-
entialism about aesthetic judgements in general, and not only with Sib-
ley’s particular version of it.
Similarly, although my focus in what follows is exclusively on aesthetic
qualities, I surmise that much of what I have to say applies equally to the
epistemology of other kinds of higher-level features, such as moral or
other values, affordances, natural or artifical kinds, dispositions, meanings,
necessary truths, or the expressiveness of behaviour and artworks. The
idea that the justification of our opinions about them is non-inferential
should also be problematic, at least to the extent to which they are insep-
arably linked to the practice to point to lower-level features in support of
the respective judgements.
In the first section of this essay, I spell out in a bit more detail what
the commitments of the non-inferentialist strategy are and contrast experi-
entially based aesthetic judgements with inferentially based ones. The sec-
ond section discusses the tension between non-inferentialism and an
evidential understanding of the support for our ascriptions of aesthetic
qualities that is provided by our reference to the underlying lower-level
features. It also introduces four different suggestions, put forward by
2 See especially F. Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, The Philosophical Review, 68 (1959) pp.
421–50; and F. Sibley, ‘Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic’, The Philosophical Review, 74 (1965), pp.
135–59. Both articles have been reprinted (the first with minor revisions) in F. Sibley,
Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics (Oxford UP, 2001), pp. 1–23 and
pp. 33–51. In what follows, I cite the reprinted versions as AC and AN, respectively.
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Sibley, of how to understand this element of support instead in non-
evidential terms.
The third and the fourth section contain the two main arguments of
this paper. First of all, I argue that none of Sibley’s proposals can account
for the supportive character of our practice of backing up our aesthetic
judgements in terms of the objects’ lower-level features. In addition, I
introduce a further objection against non-inferentialism, according to
which this view cannot explain why our curiosity in aesthetic matters is
limited to certain metaphysical facts about the aesthetic qualities of the
objects concerned. My conclusion is that non-inferentialism can explain
neither the limitations to our aesthetic curiosity, nor our practice of bol-
stering our aesthetic judgements by pointing to relevant lower-level fea-
tures. By contrast, an evidential and inferential understanding of this kind
of support for aesthetic judgements promises to have the resources to
account for both aspects of aesthetic appreciation.
I. EXPERIENCE, INFERENCE, AND JUSTIFICATION
Non-inferentialism about aesthetic judgements is the view that their basic
or canonical justification is non-inferential. Our justification for forming a
certain judgement (or for having the corresponding belief) is non-inferen-
tial just in case it does not depend on, or derive from, our justification to
form some other judgement (or to have some other belief). When we are
enticed to judge that some street is wet in response to seeing the wetness
of the street, our justification for forming this judgement is non-inferen-
tial: it does not matter which other judgements we are justified to form.
By contrast, our justification is inferential when our judgement about, or
perception of, the wetness of the street moves us to judge that it has
rained. For we are justified in judging that it has rained only if, and
partly because, we are justified in judging that the street is wet.3
This way of distinguishing non-inferential and inferential justification is
neutral on whether non-inferential (e.g., perceptual) justification is reason-
involving. While some non-inferentialists like McDowell believe it is, oth-
ers like Sibley do not (AN, pp. 39f. and 42ff.). But even if non-inferential
justification is a matter of non-inferential reasons, it is not a matter of
reasoning, that is, of the consideration of inferential reasons for or against
3 See M.G.F. Martin, ‘The Rational Role of Experience’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 93 (1992), pp. 71–88; and J. Pryor, ‘There is Immediate Justification’, in M. Steup
and E. Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 181–202.
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forming the judgement in question. Justification by reasoning is always
inferential.4
Now, although there are potentially other sources of non-inferential justi-
fication (e.g., testimony), non-inferentialism in aesthetic matters is best and
most naturally supplemented by the claim that what is central to the forma-
tion and justification of judgements about the aesthetic qualities of objects is
our aesthetic experience of them – what Sibley has called aesthetic perception.
Our opinions about aesthetic qualities are, accordingly, the result of experi-
ence, rather than that of reasoning (AN, pp. 34 and 40). Indeed, it is com-
mon to take aesthetic perception to be essential to the occurrence not only
of the judgemental, but also of the emotional and evaluative elements
involved in aesthetic appreciation: it is essential to our aesthetic engagement
with artworks and other aesthetic objects in a very comprehensive way (AN,
p. 34). This is partly a consequence of the fact that all aesthetic appreciation
starts with the recognition of aesthetic qualities, before it can then develop
into some richer form of aesthetic engagement.
What non-inferentialists mean by aesthetic perception is a kind of expe-
riential awareness of the aesthetic qualities of objects, which provides us
with non-inferential justification for aesthetic judgement.5 But they rightly
do not assume aesthetic perception to be an instance of ordinary percep-
tion; and Sibley is very clear on the fact that our ability to recognise aes-
thetic qualities goes beyond our normal perceptual and recognitional
capacities.6 What is instead central to, and distinctive of, aesthetic percep-
tion is, at least for Sibley, that it involves the exercise of ‘aesthetic sensitiv-
ity, perceptiveness, or taste’.7 He does not really say anything more about
this special kind of sensitivity.8 But it seems fair to assume that he under-
stands aesthetic sensitivity as a largely acquired ability that is open to fur-
ther training and education – perhaps, again, in contrast to our basic
perceptual capacities. In fact, it may very well be questioned whether aes-
thetic perception in the non-inferentialist’s sense is really closer to ordin-
ary perception than, say, to what others have identified as intellectual
feelings or seemings, or as rational or empirical intuitions.9
Endorsing non-inferentialism by treating our recognition of aesthetic
qualities as experiential has the advantage of providing us with a simple
explanation of the frequent immediacy of the formation of our aesthetic
4 See Sibley, AC, pp. 14f.; and Sibley, AN, pp. 39f.
5 See Sibley, AN; and Schellekens, ‘Towards a Reasonable Objectivism’.
6 See Sibley, AC, pp. 14f.; and Sibley, AN, pp. 33ff.
7 Sibley, AN, p. 33. See also Sibley, AC, p. 1.
8 See Budd, ‘Aesthetic Judgements’.
9 See D. Bodrozic, ‘Introduction: Special Issue on Intuitions’, dialectica, 58 (2004), pp. 3–
10.
664 FABIAN DORSCH
© 2013 The Author The Philosophical Quarterly © 2013 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
judgements. As already suggested, it does not seem to require any conscious
reasoning on our side to recognise the elegance of a gait, or the expression
of sadness in a piece of music. We do not start off with certain premisses
about the gait or the music and infer from there that they are elegant or
expressive of sadness. Instead, we just form the respective judgement in
direct response to our experience of the movement or the piece of music.
The assumption that our access to elegance or expressed sadness is experi-
ential enables us to explain this immediate motivation of our judgement.
But it is important to keep in mind that there may be alternative ways
of accounting for it, notably in terms of implicit or internalised reasoning.
Consider the example of a good chess-player or mathematician. She may
be able to immediately spot the quality of a move, or how to proceed in
a proof. But she had to engage in extensive reasoning in order to acquire
and develop this skill. She had to get used to making the right rational
connections within her field between a certain type of position or problem
and the best response to it. She may now be able to form some of her
judgements without relying on any explicit inferences. But she was not
able to do so in the past; and some other of her current judgements
about which steps to pursue in a game of chess or a mathematical proof
are still likely to require extensive conscious calculation. However, what is
important to note is that her motivationally immediate judgements are
not just mere causal responses, like a feeling of pain or hunger. They are
still rational responses to the situation before her, and to be justified by
reference to an argument which may be rehearsed by her in an explicit
way. That is, they are grounded in some implicit line of reasoning, which
is the result of some process of internalisation or habituation during her
conscious engagement in similar inferences in the past.
Despite their common immediate formation, judgements grounded in
implicit inferences differ from experientially grounded judgements in at
least two respects. First, our capacity to form them depends on our past
engagement in explicit inferences of a closely related kind. By contrast,
we do not learn to experientially recognise something through the inter-
nalisation of patterns of inferential reasoning. Secondly, the justification of
implicitly inferred judgements is, of course, inferential: it stays the same
independently of whether the inferences involved are rendered explicit or
not. By contrast, experience provides us with non-inferential justification,
which cannot be stated by reference to some inferential pattern.10 Inferen-
tialism and non-inferentialism about some type of judgements therefore
differ not only in whether they take the judgements’ justification to be
10 See Martin, ‘The Rational Role of Experience’.
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non-inferential, but also in whether acquiring the capacity to form them
requires engagement in some related form of explicit reasoning.
Now, can non-inferentialism accept that an experientially grounded
judgement may also be open to inferential justification? The answer, at
least in the case of basic perceptual judgements, should be both yes and
no. It should be yes in so far as we can form legitimate perceptual judge-
ments on the basis of reasoning. But it should be no in so far as the justi-
fication involved is, ultimately, non-inferential in nature. We can infer
that something is red, for instance, once we know the wavelength spec-
trum of the light emitted by its surface in broad daylight.11 Hence, if chal-
lenged, we can support our perceptually based colour judgement in an
inferential manner, namely by pointing to the underlying reflectance
properties of the red object. But this presupposes that we have knowledge
of the correlation between colours (or, more directly, colour experiences)
and wavelength spectra. And discovering these correlations requires, ulti-
mately, consciously experiencing colours and matching them up with
reflectance properties.12 What this illustrates is that the justification of a
colour judgement by reference to the light reflected by the object con-
cerned is, in the end, non-inferential. So, while colour judgements may to
some extent be inferentially justified, the inferential justification involved
has to derive its force from some prior non-inferential justification. This is
part of what it means that perceptual experience is our canonical access
to colours: other forms of access depend on it.
The situation should not be different in the case of aesthetic qualities,
assuming that they are indeed open to experiential access. Sibley has con-
vincingly argued that we generally cannot deduce, or infer by means of
aesthetic principles, the presence of aesthetic qualities on the basis of
knowledge about the object’s lower-level features, even though the former
metaphysically depend in one way or another on the latter (AC, § I).
Apart from a few special cases (such as the fact that bright colours entail
garishness, or symmetry balance), there is really only one exception to his
conclusion: if we have full knowledge of the most determinate non-aes-
thetic properties and all the aesthetic qualities of an object, we can reason
that the same qualities are present in another object simply on the basis
of learning that it possesses exactly the same lower-level properties.13 Any
11 See F. Dorsch, Die Natur der Farben (The Nature of Colours) (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2009), ch.
2.6.
12 See F. Dorsch, ‘Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism’, Rivista di Estetica 43
(2010), pp. 85–108.
13 See F. Dorsch, ‘The Limits of Aesthetic Empiricism’, in G. Currie, M. Kieran and
A. Meskin (eds), Aesthetics and the Sciences of the Mind (Oxford UP, forthcoming). On the spe-
cial cases, see Sibley, AC, n. 6; and Budd, ‘Aesthetic Judgements’, p. 302.
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more specific knowledge – say, just of the less determinate non-aesthetic
properties, or of the fact that only some of the most determinate non-
aesthetic properties are responsible for the realisation of a particular
aesthetic quality – does not allow for a similar kind of principle-based infer-
ence. For non-aesthetic properties matter for the instantiation of aesthetic
qualities on the level of their highest specifity, and relative to their wider
context. A slight change in the shape of a vase, or the addition of a certain
pattern of colours, may undermine its initially elegant appearance.14
For a non-inferentialist like Sibley, the inference from the non-aesthetic
to the aesthetic features of an object is justified only to the extent to
which it is based on a prior experience of the object’s aesthetic qualities,
combined with the recognition that they occur in correlation with the
object’s non-aesthetic properties. That is, any inferential support for expe-
rientially grounded aesthetic judgements is, ultimately, dependent on
some prior experience. We first have to discover experientially which
lower-level properties are responsible for which aesthetic qualities before
we can infer the presence of the latter by recognising the presence of the
former.
II. THE CHALLENGE FROM RATIONAL PRACTICE
As already noted at the beginning, aesthetic qualities depend for their
instantiation on certain lower-level features of the objects concerned. This
means that the latter are responsible for the exemplification of the former
and determine which particular aesthetic qualities are instantiated (AN,
pp. 35f.). Among non-inferentialists, there has been some debate about
whether the lower-level features suffice to fully condition the instantiation
and nature of the aesthetic properties that they realise; and, if yes,
whether this asymmetric relation of dependence and determination
should be best understood in terms of (anomalous) supervenience, emer-
gence, grounding, or something similar.15 However, non-inferentialists are
not forced to accept either claim, as the example of Sibley illustrates, who
leaves room for the possibility of other determining factors (such as
aspects of sensitivity) over and above the lower-level features.16
14 See Budd, ‘Aesthetic Judgements’, pp. 301f.
15 See, e.g., N. Zangwill, The Metaphysics of Beauty (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001); J. Levin-
son, ‘Aesthetic Supervenience’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), pp. 93–110; or J.
Benovsky, ‘Aesthetic Supervenience vs. Aesthetic Grounding’, Estetika: the Central European
Journal of Aesthetics, 49 (2012), pp. 166–78.
16 See J.E. MacKinnon, ‘Scruton, Sibley, and Supervenience’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism, 58 (2000), pp. 383–92.
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Independently of this debate, it is common ground that we should be
able to supplement our aesthetic judgements by reference to the lower-
level features. It is indeed an important aspect of our critical engagement
with bearers of aesthetic qualities that we are expected to be able to iden-
tify some of the relevant underlying properties and their significance for
the exemplification of the aesthetic qualities in question.17 We do not sim-
ply tell others, say, that we find a given painting balanced or pale, but
draw their attention to the underlying symmetry of the design or the un-
saturatedness of the colours in support of our opinion. If we are unable
to follow the request of others to back up our judgements in this way, the
quality of our judgements and, more generally, our status as a judge of
aesthetic matters are diminished. Part of the explanation of why it is
important and required to be able to identify the lower-level features and
their link to the aesthetic qualities is that what matters for aesthetic appre-
ciation is not merely the presence of aesthetic qualities, but also the par-
ticular ways in which they are realised by the lower-level features of the
objects concerned.18
This highlights an important difference between aesthetic cognition (as
well as other forms of higher-level cognition) and our basic perception of
colours, smells, sounds, and so on. For it is unreasonable to demand of us
to supplement our colour or similar judgements by referring to more fun-
damental features of the objects at issue. At best, we may be asked to elu-
cidate why we take our respective perceptual experiences to be in order.
This difference is perhaps best explained by reference to the fact that col-
ours and similar properties – in contrast to aesthetic qualities – are not
dependent on more basic perceivable (or otherwise easily accessible) features
of their bearers. Given that seeing the redness of an object does not
require noticing any of the unperceivable features responsible for that
instance of redness, it is unreasonable to demand that the perceiver is
able to identify those unperceivable features. By contrast, as Sibley has
repeatedly noted (AN, pp. 38 and 41), we recognise aesthetic qualities by
recognising the accessible underlying features on which they depend.
The question is now what kind of support is at issue here, and there-
fore also what kind of quality or value of aesthetic judgement. It may
seem natural, from a pre-theoretical point of view, to maintain that our
awareness of the lower-level features provides us with evidence (or epistemic
reasons) for judging or believing that the object concerned possesses
17 See Sibley, AC, pp. 14ff.; Sibley, AN, pp. 37ff. and 41f.; and O. Conolly and B. Hay-
dar, ‘Aesthetic Principles’, The British Journal of Aesthetics, 43 (2003), pp. 114–25, at pp. 114ff.
18 See M. Budd, ‘The Acquaintance Principle’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 43 (2003), pp.
386–92.
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certain aesthetic qualities. But non-inferentialists cannot accommodate
this interpretation of our practice.
The evidential support in question has to be inferential in nature, given
that it consists in the presence of one kind of feature (i.e., a set of lower-
level properties) speaking in favour of the presence of another kind (i.e.,
some aesthetic quality). This would be unproblematic for non-inferential-
ism if it could be argued that any such inferential support ultimately
depends on some more basic experiential justification. In the preceding
section, I outlined how this is generally possible with respect to colour
judgements: they may receive further inferential support, even if they
are experientially grounded, because there are discernible correlations
between colours and the underlying reflectance properties. However, with
respect to aesthetic cognition, such cases are rather rare and exceptional
since the our knowledge of correlations between aesthetic and non-aes-
thetic features is limited to the realisation of aesthetic properties by the
sum of the most determinate non-aesthetic properties of the object in
question. Accordingly, we could at best infer the aesthetic nature of a
given artwork from the aesthetic nature of a (hardly ever existing) near-
identical artwork. Our practice of providing further support for our opin-
ions, on the other hand, applies to all instances of aesthetic judgement.
So, the justificatory power of recognising relevant lower-level features can-
not derive from some prior experiential engagement with artworks very
similar to the one at issue.
Because of this, non-inferentialists cannot take the evidence for aes-
thetic judgements provided by our access to the lower-level features of
artworks to be strong enough to be able to inferentially ground aesthetic
judgements, whether on its own or in conjunction with further consider-
ations or experiences. For, otherwise, aesthetic judgements would turn
out to be open to justification that is at bottom inferential, contrary to
what non-inferentialism claims. Hence, the kind of evidence under consid-
eration has to be assumed to provide some inferential justification for aes-
thetic judgements, without this justification ever being strong enough to
be actually able to inferentially ground such judgements. This seems to
be the view recently put forward by Elisabeth Schellekens, who takes aes-
thetic judgements to be experience- rather than inference-based, yet still
allows the recognition of (or ‘reflection’ on) the underlying non-aesthetic
properties to add ‘some kind of rational justification’.19
But there are good reasons to doubt the existence of evidence of this
kind. For one thing, it remains unclear how such weak evidence could
19 See Schellekens, ‘Towards a Reasonable Objectivism’, p. 177.
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add anything at all to the epistemic support provided by experiences of
aesthetic qualities, if that experiential support is assumed to be already
strong enough to ground aesthetic judgements on its own. More impor-
tantly, it is difficult to understand how there could be pieces of inferential
evidence that could never figure in justifying inferences. Even the weakest
inferential evidence for a given judgement should in principle be able to
combine with further considerations or experiences (and in the absence of
any counterevidence) to justify the formation of that judgement. Other-
wise, there would be no reason to talk of inferential evidence or, indeed, of
evidence: there would be no obvious sense in which the ‘evidence’ in ques-
tion could still count as speaking in favour of the formation of the judge-
ment. This is just to say that inferential evidence is minimally prima facie,
or pro tanto, or something similar: there is no such thing as inferential
evidence (or an inferential reason) that cannot under any circumstances
inferentially ground judgement.
Schellekens mentions two ideas that might serve as foundations for
non-inferentialist replies to the preceding considerations. The first is that
the evidential support in question is merely retrospective, that is, comes
into existence or acquires potency only after the formation of the aesthetic
judgements concerned.20 Accordingly, the question of whether the evi-
dence could contribute to the initial formation and justification of such
judgements would not arise. However, it is difficult to understand how
some inferential evidence could have retrospective, but no prospective
power of justification. More specifically, there is no good reason to accept
that whether the awareness of the lower-level features possesses justifica-
tory power depends on whether it occurs after the experience-based
occurrence of the judgement concerned. The second idea is that the ref-
erence to lower-level features might not directly lead to the sustainment
or revision of opinion, but only indirectly by a reaffirmation or change of
the experience on which the original judgement was based.21 But since
experiences are not sensitive to evidence (or epistemic reasons), the impact
of the recognition of the lower-level features would have to be merely
causal and non-evidential.22
Not surprisingly, Sibley maintains that reference to the underlying
properties cannot supplement the epistemic justification of our aesthetic
judgements. Instead of treating the lower-level features as reasons for ascrib-
ing aesthetic qualities, he proposes to identify them as reasons why some-
thing possesses certain aesthetic qualities (AN, pp. 41f. and 43f.). The
20 ibid., pp. 176f.
21 ibid., n. 39.
22 The second idea is in fact a variation of Sibley’s proposal (ii) to be discussed later.
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distinction appealed to here is that between epistemic reasons and what
Sibley sometimes identifies as explanatory reasons.23 The first are reasons
for forming a judgement or belief and are cited in the justification of the
latter. The second, by contrast, are reasons (or facts) that are responsible
for something being a certain way and thus may be used to explain why
it is that way – in this case, why something possesses certain aesthetic
qualities, and possibly also why it causes us to have certain responses.
The non-inferentialist proposal is that pointing to the lower-level fea-
tures has no evidential, but just explanatory force: it helps us to under-
stand how the aesthetic qualities are realised in the object concerned, and
perhaps also what is causally responsible for our awareness of those quali-
ties. It is important to note that the explanation concerned is neither of a
rational, nor of an epistemic nature: it does not answer the question of
why – that is, for which epistemic reasons – we have formed our judge-
ment. Rather, he insists that it is an answer to the question of why – that
is, because of which features – the object possesses the aesthetic qualities
ascribed in the judgement (AN, pp. 36 and 41ff.). What we are concerned
with here are therefore metaphysical explanations that single out the
lower-level features responsible for the presence of aesthetic qualities, as
well as possibly for our recognition of the latter. To use some of Sibley’s
examples, the concentration of the blues and greys of a painting gives rise
to and determines its unity of tone; and the sombre or indecisive charac-
ter of a musical passage is due to a prominent change in key (AN, p. 36).
Moreover, the lower-level features are part of what causes us to recognise
them and, subsequently, the aesthetic qualities which they determine or
realise. The corresponding explanations do not rationalise our aesthetic
responses, but instead highlight certain constitutional, causal or otherwise
metaphysical connections in the world (AN, pp. 41f. and 43f.). That is,
they cite (what may be called) metaphysical explanatory reasons.
The main task for the non-inferentialist is therefore to elucidate how
reference to metaphysical connections or reasons may help us to back up
our aesthetic judgements in a non-evidential manner; and moreover may
do so in such a way that we can reasonably demand such a kind of
defence from good critics. If the non-inferential approach fails to come
up with a satisfactory answer, our practice of asking for additional support
in aesthetic matters would remain completely unexplained.
But how could highlighting metaphysical facts and formulating corre-
sponding metaphysical explanations contribute to the normative standing
23 See Sibley, AC, p. 12; Sibley, AN, 38; and also Schellekens, ‘Towards a Reasonable
Objectivism’.
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of aesthetic judgement? Sibley identifies four different ways in which ref-
erence to the lower-level features and their metaphysical contribution to
aesthetic properties may add some kind of non-evidential support to our
judgemental ascriptions of the former qualities: (i) it may enable or help
us, and others, to actually experience the aesthetic qualities; (ii) it may
increase our confidence, and the confidence of others, in our aesthetic
judgements; (iii) it may enrich our aesthetic appreciation and render it
more intelligible; and (iv) it may satisfy a curiosity of ours which is distinc-
tive of our aesthetic engagement with objects (AN, pp. 37f.).
What remains to be seen is whether one (or more) of these four
potential effects of noting the metaphysical connection between the two
sets of properties can really count as supporting or supplementing
aesthetic judgement in a non-evidential manner. More concretely, the
non-inferential approach needs to elucidate the impact of these factors on
the standing of aesthetic judgements independently of any evidential con-
siderations. And it needs to account for the normative dimension of the
reference to the lower-level features – namely that good critics should be
able, when challenged, to identify these features and their impact on the
aesthetic qualities. Whether the non-inferentialist can satisfactorily address
these issues is the topic of the next two sections.
III. GUIDANCE, CONFIDENCE, AND ENRICHMENT OF
APPRECIATION
Let me begin with (i), Sibley’s observation that pointing out the relevant
lower-level features and their aesthetic significance may help people to rec-
ognise for themselves the aesthetic qualities realised by the former. As far as
it goes, this observation seems to be accurate. But it is compatible with a
denial of the experientiality of the recognition of aesthetic qualities, as well
as with the postulation of an inferential link between our awareness of the
lower-level features and our judgemental ascriptions of the aesthetic quali-
ties. Indeed, recognising the lower-level features and their contribution to
the realisation of the aesthetic qualities may help us to notice the latter pre-
cisely because it provides us with further evidence for ascribing the latter.
Of course, Sibley would insist that, by referring to the lower-level fea-
tures, critics provide a ‘perceptual proof’ of their judgements, and not an
inferential one. His thought is that the critic’s ‘aim [is] to bring his audience
to agree with him because they perceiv[e] for themselves what he perceive
[s]’ (AN, p. 40). But since perceptions or experiences cannot be the output of
inferences, it follows that the proposed method of demonstration for
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aesthetic judgements cannot be inferential (ibid.). However, this line of rea-
soning is successful only if it is assumed that our recognition of aesthetic
qualities is indeed experiential. So it cannot be used, without begging the
question, against a view that denies exactly this assumption.
Furthermore, the observation at issue – that reference to suitable
lower-level features may help people to recognise aesthetic qualities – can-
not elucidate why we take the identification of those lower-level features
realising the aesthetic qualities to add something to the defence of the
ascription of the latter. It has been explained how this identification may
lead to the formation of aesthetic judgements (namely of others), but not
how it may support or supplement them. In particular, our demand that
good critics should be able to back up their own judgements by pointing
to the responsible lower-level features when challenged is distinct from
our expectation that good critics should be able to make other people rec-
ognise aesthetic properties. The former concerns the task of convincing a
sceptic about the aesthetic qualities ascribed, while the latter concerns the
task of educating people and of improving their aesthetic sensibility.
It is true that one efficient way of convincing a sceptic is to get him to
recognise the disputed aesthetic quality for himself.24 But it is not the only
way and can neither be required, nor hoped for, in response to a challenge
to an aesthetic judgement. This is reflected by the fact that the educational
function of the reference to the lower-level features is of no interest to
someone who is already able to recognise the aesthetic quality concerned.
By contrast, the explanatory and supportive function of that reference may
still be very important for that person. For instance, she may be unsure
about her own aesthetic judgement and may therefore feel the need to
supplement it further by identifying the relevant lower-level features. Or
she may disagree with the other person about which such underlying
features in fact realise the aesthetic quality and support its ascription.
Perhaps Sibley’s idea (ii) – that pointing to certain lower-level features
in order to explain the presence of a particular aesthetic quality may
increase our trust or confidence in our corresponding aesthetic judgement
– can better account for this supportive role. The situation envisaged is
like this: we experience, and judge, a passage of music to have a sombre
character; we independently notice a change in key in the passage and
link its presence to the presence of the sombre character; and noticing
this link leads us, as well as others, to feel more confident about our
judgement, and perhaps also more inclined to rely on our experience.
24 See E. Brady, ‘Introduction: Sibley’s Vision’, in E. Brady and J. Levinson (eds.),
Aesthetic Concepts: Essays after Sibley (Oxford UP, 2001), pp. 1–22, at pp. 14f.
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But why does our recognition of the lower-level features and their contri-
bution to the realisation of the aesthetic qualities render our aesthetic
judgement more trustworthy in our own eyes and the eyes of others?
One possible answer is to maintain that the increase in confidence does
not consist in a strengthening of epistemic trust, but rather in something like
a merely causal influence on some non-rational feeling of confidence or cer-
tainty, or some non-rational disposition to rely on our aesthetic experience
and judgement. Accordingly, the increase in trust reflects no positive contri-
bution from an epistemic point of view. To the contrary, it is actually in
danger of rendering our aesthetic judgements epistemically inadequate. For
it may decrease its epistemic standing (e.g., its likelihood of being true) by
making us less critical and less responsive to opposing reasons. That is, we
risk holding on to our judgement for non-epistemic causes, namely an
increased feeling of confidence or a strengthened disposition to trust.
Although the gain of confidence need not necessarily have these negative
consequences, it also has no positive effects because of which it could count
as adding something valuable to our aesthetic judgements.
So, perhaps the kind of confidence involved amounts rather to some kind
of epistemic credence or trust. But, as noted above, the non-inferentialist
wants to deny that our knowledge of the metaphysical underpinnings of aes-
thetic qualities supplies us with evidence for believing in the exemplification
of the latter. Hence, the non-inferentialist should rather say that what we
are concerned with here is not the evidential justification of the particular
aesthetic judgements, but instead our general trustworthiness as critics in
aesthetic matters. In other words, the suggestion should be that our manifes-
tation of the ability to recognise the lower-level features and their realisation
of the aesthetic qualities is an indicator of the quality of our aesthetic sensi-
tivity, at least on this particular occasion. It reveals that we are good judges
of aesthetic qualities and, in this sense, adds further support to our aesthetic
judgements. Similarly, if we discover that someone is very good in visually
differentiating and identifying objects far away, we may trust his respective
judgements more than those of less discerning people.
But this proposal is flawed. Part of the reason for this is that the com-
parison with visual discrimination actually reveals a significant difference.
We find out whether someone is good at recognising objects in the dis-
tance by looking at whether his past discriminations and judgements have
been accurate. That is, we trust him because, in the past, he was mostly
right about the distinctness and identity of distant objects. The parallel
suggestion in the aesthetic case would be that we have confidence in
someone (who may actually be identical with ourselves) because, in the
past, he was mostly successful in recognising aesthetic qualities. The pro-
674 FABIAN DORSCH
© 2013 The Author The Philosophical Quarterly © 2013 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
posal at hand, however, locates the reason for the increase in trust, not in
the quality of (past) recognitions of aesthetic qualities, but instead in the
quality of (present) recognitions of the underling realisators of such quali-
ties. Accordingly, the suggestion is that we should trust someone’s aes-
thetic judgements because he has shown himself to be able to identify the
lower-level features and their contribution to the aesthetic qualities.
Now, this proposal can be made to work only if it is true that someone,
who is good at the identification of aesthetically relevant lower-level fea-
tures, is also good at recognising aesthetic qualities. This would be the
case if the awareness of the lower-level features would actually enable or
help him to discover the relevant aesthetic qualities, either along the lines
of proposal (i), or because this awareness would provide him with evi-
dence for the ascription of the qualities. But both options are not open to
the non-inferentialist: the first for the reasons outlined at the beginning of
this section; and the second due to the view’s commitment to the non-
evidential character of the support provided by our awareness of the
lower-level features. However, if proposal (i) fails and the abilitity to rec-
ognise lower-level properties as realisators of aesthetic qualities does not
reveal a sensitivity to evidence (or epistemic reasons) for aesthetic judge-
ments, then it becomes mysterious why the possession of this ability
should have any bearing on the epistemic standing of someone as a judge
in aesthetic matters. There is no reason to assume that someone who pos-
sesses knowledge of how aesthetic qualities are realised, should count as a
better judge of aesthetic qualities than someone who lacks that kind of
knowledge. A blind person may know everything about how colours are
realised by their bearers. But this does not render him good at experien-
tially (rather than inferentially) recognising the colours of objects.
Two other epistemically relevant factors to be checked are the suitabil-
ity of the specific viewing conditions and the proper operation of the
mind of the experiencing subject (e.g., whether he is distracted, suffers
from some cognitive or neurophysiological deficiencies, or lacks the
required discriminatory or conceptual abilities). But, again, the normalcy
or faultlessness of these factors cannot be established by reference to the
lower-level features of the experienced objects. It is true that, if we dis-
cover that someone does not see an object as yellow, despite the fact that
our best colour science predicts it to be yellow, we may actually have
good reason to suspect that there is something wrong with the viewing
conditions or the mind of the person. But this conclusion is possible only
because our scientifically gained knowledge of the connection between
reflectance properties and colours allows us to infer the yellowness of the
object at issue. Non-inferentialists about aesthetic judgements deny, how-
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ever, that a similar kind of inference is possible in the case of aesthetic
experience. So, whether the circumstances are suitable for aesthetic judge-
ment and whether the critic’s mind is working properly cannot be
decided on the basis of recognising certain lower-level features of the
object. In accordance with this, our practice of challenging the aesthetic
judgements of other subjects typically presupposes that there is nothing
wrong with respect to these two epistemically relevant factors.
Understanding in more detail how aesthetic qualities are realised by
the lower-level features of specific objects may very well add something to
our aesthetic experience of those objects. More specifically, it may enrich
the latter by enabling us to fully appreciate why some object possesses this
aesthetic value and not another, or by enabling us to respond with ade-
quate aesthetic emotions to the object, thus offering the possibility of
accepting Sibley’s proposal (iii). However, as important as this enrichment
might be, it does not affect the standing of our aesthetic judgements. At
best, it may bestow some value on our related, but independently
acquired knowledge of the realisation of the aesthetic qualities by the
lower-level features. For it is arguably this kind of knowledge – rather
than the mere judgemental ascription of aesthetic qualities – which is cru-
cial for the occurrence of aesthetic evaluations and emotions.25 But there
is no obvious sense in which the possible enrichment of the parts of
appreciation that go beyond aesthetic perception and judgement adds
something positive to the status of the experientially based aesthetic judge-
ments involved in the same instance of appreciation.
IV. THE CHALLENGE FROM AESTHETIC CURIOSITY
This leaves us with element (iv) in Sibley’s account of the impact of meta-
physical reasons on aesthetic judgements: the satisfaction of a distinctively
aesthetic kind of curiosity. Sibley’s idea appears to be that we have a spe-
cifically aesthetic interest in coming to know which lower-level features
are responsible for the aesthetic qualities of an object, and how the for-
mer contribute to the determination of the latter. Satisfying this kind of
curiosity is then taken to support or supplement our aesthetic judgement,
albeit not by adding to the latter’s evidential justification.
It seems undeniable that our desire to understand artworks and similar
objects includes that we care about knowing how aesthetic qualities are
realised by relevant lower-level features, and not infrequently more than
25 See Budd, ‘The Acquaintance Principle’.
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about knowing that the aesthetic qualities are instantiated in the first
place.26 When considering artworks with a high degree of originality, say,
our critical activity typically focusses less on the relatively unspecific and
obvious fact that they are original, and more on the precise and partially
hidden ways in which they manage to be so. Correspondingly, there is likely
to be much more disagreement about the latter than about the former.
Once we compare this aesthetic type of curiosity with its scientific counter-
part, however, the proposal turns out to be problematic. The main difficulty
is to delineate the kind of interest distinctively linked to aesthetic judgement
and appreciation, and to get clear in which sense its satisfaction might add
something to our aesthetic judgements.
When we engage with artworks on our own or talk about them with oth-
ers, we may refer to the lower-level features of the works for various reasons,
not all of which are concerned with the appreciation of their aesthetic value,
or with the explanation of why they possess their aesthetic qualities. Painters
may be curious about the kind of paint used because they are impressed by its
durability and want to try it out for themselves. Historians may be interested
in the type of wood of a painting’s frame in order to get clearer about why
people at that time used different kinds of wood for different purposes. Biolo-
gists may have a similar interest in the wood because they study the distribu-
tion of types of tree in the region where the painting was made. However,
these are not cases of aesthetic curiosity, but rather examples of a practical,
historical or similar form of interest. Even when we are aiming to understand
the metaphysically explanatory link between lower-level features and aes-
thetic properties, this need not happen because of any aesthetic interest in the
object in question. A metaphysician worrying about the ontological status of
aesthetic properties or artworks may concern himself with the relation of
determination holding between the non-aesthetic and the aesthetic in the
hope that this will shed light on some of his philosophical problems.
But even if our interest in an object and its features is clearly aesthetic in
nature, we do not care about all possible metaphysical explanations of the
presence of aesthetic qualities. When we notice that the harmony of a paint-
ing is partly due to the fact that the gestures and postures of the depicted
characters are roughly mirrored in the spatial orientation of elements of the
landscape, such as trees or roads, we do not care about how much the
respective lines in fact diverge from being straight lines or true parallels. Or
when we recognise that the dramatic nature of a piece of music is partly a
matter of a continuous and rhythmic low pitch sound, we are not really cap-
tivated by the additional knowledge of the specific length of the sound
26 See Budd, ‘The Acquaintance Principle’.
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waves, or of the precise intervals of the rhythm specified in milliseconds.
None the less, these latter facts about the piece of music, just as the actual
angle between the lines on the painting, may very well be used, from a
metaphysical perspective, to account for the harmonious or dramatic char-
acters of the works. To take an even more radical example, the harmony of
the painting – like most of its other aesthetic qualities – depends on the spe-
cific nature and distribution of the molecules making up the paint on the
canvas. But we do not pay attention to that molecular structure while expe-
riencing and appreciating the painting.
It is true that, when we are aiming to fully appreciate a painting, we
may be interested in physical facts about the wooden panel or the paint
used, which tell us something about the age of the work; or in the results
of an X-ray investigation, which reveal something about the development
of the artist’s ideas during the process of painting. But we normally do
not care about the precise length of the light waves reflected by the col-
oured canvas, or about the molecular structure of the oil used in mixing
the paint. The respective facts strike us as aesthetically irrelevant, as not
in any way enriching our understanding of the work. Similarly, there may
be future artworks, the recognition of the aesthetic properties of which
requires us to study the reflectance properties of their surfaces, or their
atomic composition. But even then, there will be metaphysical facts – for
instance, about the subatomic particles – which we do not care about
from an aesthetic perspective.
A scientist or metaphysician, on the other hand, has an interest in con-
tinuing to investigate, given that his goal is to fully comprehend the nat-
ure and origin of the objects concerned. It is here that we find a central
difference between aesthetic and scientific curiosity. The latter is not
restricted to certain metaphysical truths and explanations. From a scien-
tific point of view, it is interesting to find out as much as possible about
the constitution and causal powers of things. In contrast, our aesthetic
curiosity is rather limited, once it comes to metaphysical matters. This
fact is in need of explanation: why are we aesthetically curious only about
some facts about the realisation of aesthetic qualities, and not others?
However, when we address this question, the problematic status of Sib-
ley’s fourth proposal and, indeed, of the non-inferential approach as a
whole becomes apparent: they simply do not have the resources to pro-
vide a satisfactory explanation of the limits of our aesthetic interest.
As a first possible answer, the non-inferentialist might suggest that our
aesthetic curiosity stops at the level of perceivability: that we do not care
about explanations which trace aesthetic qualities back to imperceivable
lower-level features. This may be true in some cases, but not in all. Many
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aesthetic qualities depend directly on imperceivable features of their bear-
ers, and we are aesthetically interested in the respective metaphysical
knowledge. We do care, for instance, about the usually imperceivable age
of a painting because it tells us something about its originality. In addi-
tion, many aesthetic qualities of novels depend on non-aesthetic features
– such as the meaning of its words, or the elements of its story-line – that
we cannot experience and have to grasp intellectually.
Similarly, it is imaginable that there may be forms of art which we are
supposed to appreciate by means of oscillographs which render otherwise
imperceivable sound or light waves accessible in the shape of changing
curves on the screen. But it is not clear whether this kind of access to the
waves – in contrast to our access to the marks on the screen – should still
count as perceptual. One simple way of dealing with these last cases
might be to treat the mentioned tools and their effects literally as part of
the artwork. Thus, the perceivable parts of the piece would be the images
of the waves produced on the screens. But this might be in tension with
the artist’s intentions, or the curatorial conventions, which do not take the
oscillographs to be part of the work. It is also doubtful whether we could
establish a satisfactory theory of which elements belong to certain art-
works of certain types, that could rule out the possibility of artworks
which are accessible only via oscillographs and the like, but do not con-
tain the latter or their perceivable effects as their parts.
Most importantly, however, noting that our aesthetic interest is, in cer-
tain cases, restricted to perceivable lower-level features and their contribu-
tion to aesthetic qualities would not amount to a very illuminating
characterisation of the limitation of aesthetic curiosity. For it would still be
in need of explanation why our interest does in fact not extend to imper-
ceivable lower-level features. For the same reason, the limitation of aesthetic
curiosity cannot be accounted for in terms of the idea that it is concerned
merely with what enables and enriches more complex and emotional aes-
thetic experiences. For, again, this would just shift the explanatory burden
since we would then need to say why this limited concern might be in place,
without simply falling back on option (iii) discussed above.
A second possible non-inferentialist answer is that we are interested only
in those metaphysical facts which we actually manage to explanatorily link
up with the aesthetic qualities. Knowing the precise angles of the nearly
parallel lines or the molecular structure of the paint may not mean much to
us because we do not recognise their contribution to the harmonious or gar-
ish character of the painting. And learning something about the wave-
lengths and temporal intervals may remain aesthetically uninteresting for us
if it does not help us to make sense of the dramatic nature of the music.
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But the problem with this proposal is that the acquisition of the miss-
ing understanding normally does not undermine our impression that ref-
erence to features like the molecular structure is aesthetically beside the
point. Coming to know the exact angles of the lines in the painting may
tell us why they are approximately parallel. And, from a purely scientific
point of view, this additional information is interesting and illuminating,
at least to some extent. But it does not add anything to our aesthetic
understanding of why the painting is harmonious. Knowing that the lines
are approximately parallel suffices here already. Similarly, that the gar-
ishness of the painting is ultimately due to the molecules of paint on its
surface is aesthetically irrelevant, even if we know how the latter contrib-
ute to the brightness and purity of the colours responsible for the former.
Importantly, the limitation of aesthetic curiosity concerns not merely our
(rather trivial) knowledge that the precise angles of the lines or the molec-
ular structure of the paint determine the aesthetic qualities of the paint-
ing, but also our (very substantial) knowledge of how the former realise
the latter – or at least how they realise the approximate parallelity of the
lines or the brightness and purity of the colours, which again realise the
latter.
A third and final option for the non-inferentialist is to maintain that
our aesthetic curiosity is limited to those lower-level features, noticing
which helps us to recognise the respective aesthetic qualities – of course
without providing us with further evidence for our aesthetic judgements.
However, this would mean that we would loose or fail to develop this
interest in the underlying properties, if we came or were already able to
recognise the aesthetic qualities in question. For instance, once we got the
other party to recognise the aesthetic qualities at issue by pointing them
to suitable lower-level features, the latter would stop being of any help for
us and would therefore cease to be relevant for our aesthetic experiences.
But this is obviously not the case in real aesthetic disputes. Even if there
is agreement on the presence of a certain aesthetic quality, we may still
refer to some lower-level features in support of our aesthetic judgement –
in fact, we may still disagree as to which lower-level features is of justifica-
tory importance. The problem is thus that the proposal under consider-
ation treats our curiosity as purely pragmatic. In particular, it ignores the
fact that there is a link between the aesthetic qualities and the underlying
lower-level features, and that this link is of significance for why identifying
the latter may provide support for ascribing the former.
So, the current challenge for the adherent of the non-inferential view –
namely to provide us with a satisfactory specification of our distinctively
aesthetic interest in certain, but not all, of the lower-level features which
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help to realise aesthetic qualities – is still unanswered. As a result, non-in-
ferentialism is subject to two serious objections, and not only one.
First, it cannot render plausible the idea that identifying the metaphysical
connection between the two sets of properties can provide some form of
non-epistemic or, more generally, non-evidential support for our aesthetic
judgements. That is, it cannot make sense of our expectation that good
critics should be able to point to lower-level features in support of their aes-
thetic judgements. At least, none of Sibley’s four proposals has been
resourceful enough to resolve this issue; and it is not clear whether there are
any other, more promising options available to the non-inferentialist about
aesthetic matters.
Secondly, as just argued, non-inferentialism cannot account for the lim-
itation of our aesthetic curiosity. In the light of both objections, non-
inferentialism in the form advocated by Sibley should be given up: it fails
to reconcile its idea of an experiential access to higher-level aesthetic
qualities with the reality of our support of the corresponding judgements
in terms of relevant lower-level features.
V. THE INFERENTIALIST ALTERNATIVE
There is, of course, a relatively simple solution to the two problems men-
tioned at the end of the last section. It consists in adopting an evidential
understanding of the support provided by the recognition of the lower-level
features. The first problem disappears immediately: pointing to relevant evi-
dence clearly bolsters our aesthetic judgements. But also the second prob-
lem can be dealt with in a straightforward manner. The key idea is to say
that, when referring to the lower-level features in aesthetic debates, we are
interested in proper justification – namely in the evidential impact of our
recognition of the lower-level features on the occurrence and epistemic
standing of our aesthetic judgements. This interpretation of our practice of
demanding and providing support for our aesthetic judgements in terms
of lower-level features explains the limits of our aesthetic curiosity in terms
of the fact that only those lower-level features matter for us, the awareness
of which provides us with evidence for (or against) our ascription of the aes-
thetic qualities concerned. We are aesthetically interested in these, but not
other, lower-level features precisely because identifying them may help us to
improve and solidify the evidential standing of our aesthetic judgements
and, as a consequence, also to advance the emotional, evaluative and other
elements of aesthetic appreciation.
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Now, it is natural to assume that evidence for (or against) the ascription
of certain properties to objects help us to infer the presence of those prop-
erty instances.27 Accordingly, the recognition that the lower-level features
of an object together provide sufficient evidence for the instantiation of a
certain aesthetic quality should put us into the position to reason to the
conclusion that the object possesses that quality. If some of the underlying
features of an artwork speak clearly in favour of its elegance, and no
other features undermine their evidential force, it should be possible for
us to infer that the object is elegant. This means, of course, giving up
non-inferentialism and endorsing inferentialism about the justification of
aesthetic judgements. The price for resolving the two problems just raised
may therefore be to have to reject the idea that we experience (or feel,
intuit, etc.) aesthetic qualities.
The inferential account, however, faces its own difficulties. One has
already been mentioned, namely the problem of accounting for the fact that
many of our aesthetic judgements are actually formed in an immediate
manner. Especially the idea of implicit inferences needs further elucidation
and support. Another problem is how to accommodate Sibley’s convincing
arguments against the existence of aesthetic principles. The most promising
idea seems to be to understand aesthetic reasoning as a special form of
abduction or informed guessing, which need not be guided by principles
and does not require conclusive or otherwise very strong evidence for justifi-
cation. We should thus perhaps start to look for an account of the inferential
justification of our aesthetic judgements – and of their frequently immediate
motivation – that is formulated in terms of some non-deductive and non-
principled (e.g., particularist) form of reasoning based on the recognition of
the realisers of aesthetic qualities, and which is therefore compatible with
Sibley’s rejection of the possibility of aesthetic judgements that are
grounded in inferential principles.28
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27 See J. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), at pp. 115f.; and T.
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